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Abstract 
 
Section I reviews some of the important contributions using time series evidence to estimate 
Social Security‟s impact on private savings. Essential to these studies is the use of a “Social 
Security Wealth” (SSW) variable, created by Martin Feldstein (1974), which defines the present 
value of future discounted Social Security benefits for the entire population under the assumption 
that each working person retires at the normal retirement age. Section II updates this Social 
Security Wealth series using both an approximation of Martin Feldstein‟s original algorithm and 
two additional methods suggested by Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy (1982). The methodology 
and assumptions are updated to better account for the richer types of data available today. 
Section III provides details on the regression specifications and data to be used. Section IV 
follows with the empirical results of these regression specifications and the point estimates of 
Social Security‟s effect on personal savings. Finally, in Section V provides an analysis of the 
effectiveness of these estimation techniques. This study finds some support that Social Security 
Wealth creates an adverse effect for private savings, as private savings is reduced by about half 
when using the most realistic assumptions for estimating Social Security Wealth, but the results 
are not robust across different types of specifications. 
 
 
 2 
Social Security in the United States provides an enormously important social insurance system designed in 
part to provide the working population with post-retirement financial support.  Because much of the population 
would not adequately save for their retirements, such a service could be considered a necessity.  However, the 
United States‟ Social Security system is pay-as-you-go, meaning that the tax collections of current workers are used 
to pay for the benefits of current retirees.  Thus, Social Security funds are not saved as would be the case if people 
were forced to rely on private savings (the sum of personal and business savings) to fund their retirements.  The 
aggregate savings of the economy could decrease if there is a private savings decrease in response to Social 
Security, which is not offset by a comparable increase in public savings.
1
  This possibility leads critics to charge that 
the Social Security program has large and significantly detrimental effects for society: less savings means less 
investment and a smaller capital stock in the future.   
The available theory, however, is ambiguous with regard to the effects of Social Security on private 
savings.  The life-cycle model of consumption, a model in which people save during their working years in order to 
consume from their accumulated savings during retirement, indicates that the wealth created from one‟s expected 
Social Security benefits could offset the need to save privately.  This is known as the “asset substitution” effect and 
provides the strongest theoretical underpinnings for the adverse effect of Social Security on savings.  A number of 
issues, though, question the overall relevance of the life-cycle model.  First, the actual validity of the life cycle 
model is questionable as people do not always save adequately for the future, and the extreme uncertainty about 
conditions far into the future makes planning quite difficult.  For this reason, people may save using rules of thumb, 
such as saving a constant fraction of their income, and minor changes in expected Social Security benefits would not 
affect savings.  The model also assumes that people actually expect to receive the amount of Social Security they are 
entitled to under present law, a point disputed by survey data discussed in the Congressional Budget Office (1998, p. 
6).  One must also examine the “retirement effect,” whereby people may decide to retire at an earlier age when 
Social Security is available and consequently may save more during their working years in order to accommodate a 
longer retirement.   
Aside from the life-cycle model, credit constraints are also relevant.  Individuals facing them may be 
unable to save more in response to a decreasing role of the Social Security program, they would merely have a 
                                                          
1
 Though, it should be noted that since 1983 more effort has been placed into enlarging the Social Security Trust 
Fund by collecting more in taxes than is paid in benefits.  This is done to provide for the expected shock when baby 
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desire to borrow even less than they do.  Furthermore, if in the absence of Social Security, children would 
increasingly provide money to help support their parents, then the impact of Social Security on savings would be 
mitigated.  Likewise, if young people save as a precaution against uncertain events while they are young, rather than 
saving for retirement, then Social Security again would have less effect.  Robert Barro (1978) also argued that the 
intergenerational transfer effect of Social Security is diminished when parents leave part of their collected benefits 
as a bequest or a gift to their children.  Of course, all of these concerns may be relevant in our heterogeneous world.  
We see that the theoretical impact of Social Security on savings is ambiguous, and one must look to the evidence to 
find the actual impact. 
Such is the goal of this paper.  Section I reviews some of the important contributions using time series 
evidence to estimate Social Security‟s impact on private savings.  Essential to these studies is the use of a “Social 
Security Wealth” (SSW) variable, created by Martin Feldstein (1974), which defines the present value of future 
discounted Social Security benefits for the entire population under the assumption that each working person retires 
at the normal retirement age.  Section II updates this Social Security Wealth series using both an approximation of 
Martin Feldstein‟s original algorithm and two additional methods suggested by Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy 
(1982).  The methodology and assumptions are updated to better account for the richer types of data available today.  
Section III provides details on the regression specifications and data to be used.   Section IV follows with the 
empirical results of these regression specifications and the point estimates of Social Security‟s effect on personal 
savings.  Finally, in Section V provides an analysis of the effectiveness of these estimation techniques.  This study 
finds some support that Social Security Wealth creates an adverse effect for private savings, as private savings is 
reduced by about half when using the most realistic assumptions for estimating Social Security Wealth, but the 
results are not robust across different types of specifications. 
I. Review of the Literature 
Martin Feldstein (1974) led the charge against Social Security, arguing that the program decreased personal 
savings by 30-50 percent between the years of 1929 and 1971.  He used an extended version of the life-cycle model 
of consumption and saving to analyze the effects of Social Security on private savings, making the age of retirement 
decision an endogenous reaction to Social Security.  He also assumed that all personal savings is done for 
retirement, ignoring the possibility of precautionary savings or bequests.  Consequently, the life-cycle model he used 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
boomers begin retiring in the coming decade.  This surplus in the trust fund is invested in special government bonds, 
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implies two countervailing effects: the “asset substitution” effect from expected Social Security benefits that should 
decrease savings, and the “retirement effect” decision to retire at a younger age that may accelerate the savings 
process to accommodate an earlier and longer retirement.  To test which effect is stronger, he used time series data 
in an attempt to see if trends in the levels of Social Security Wealth are correlated with trends in personal savings, 
controlling for other factors.  If higher levels of consumption are correlated with higher levels of Social Security 
Wealth, other things being equal, then the conclusion is that Social Security has a negative effect on personal 
savings (since income is either consumed or saved).  Feldstein used a basic consumption function for his regression, 
with personal consumption expenditure as the independent variable, and Social Security Wealth, disposable income, 
both current and lagged, and total household wealth as his primary dependent variables.  For some regressions, he 
also included gross corporate retained earnings as a proxy for current and future capital gains, which people could 
expect to eventually receive but that would not be reflected in household wealth.   Again, he concluded that Social 
Security Wealth substantially decreases the level of personal savings in the United States economy, demonstrating 
that the “asset substitution” effect of his extended life cycle model is quite strong.2   
Barro (1978) started with the hypothesis that Social Security Wealth would not affect private savings; 
instead, it would only affect the amount of wealth that parents bequest to their children.  His paper took Feldstein‟s 
Social Security Wealth variable as given, but developed a more rigorous regression specification by adding retained 
earnings, the unemployment rate multiplied by disposable income, a measure of the stock of consumer durables, and 
the surplus of the government sector.  Barro‟s conclusion is that the time series evidence for the United States does 
not support the hypothesis that Social Security depresses private savings. 
However, Feldstein made an error in calculating his Social Security Wealth variable, casting doubts on all 
of the time series work conducted before the discovery of the error by Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy in 1980.  The 
error led SSW to grow much too quickly in the years after 1957, when a one time increase in benefits to widows in 
1956 was accidentally repeated in all subsequent years.  By 1971, the series was about 40% larger than it should 
have been.  Aside from correcting the error, Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) also developed a number of other algorithms 
for the computation of Social Security Wealth.  The reason for controversy on this topic is that no one really knows 
how people go about estimating what their future Social Security benefits will be.  Feldstein assumed that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and thus constitutes a form of savings.  
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individuals in all years expected the same “constant ratio” of benefits to their disposable income to continue 
indefinitely.  Leimer and Lesnoy developed several other algorithms of increasingly complex but reasonable ways 
for people to calculate future benefits.  The “current ratio” perception assumes that individuals are shortsighted and 
simply expect the ratio of benefits to income in the current year to be projected into the future.  The “best 
information perception” assumes that individuals base their projections on the best available published information 
of each year.  This method requires the most data collection, as actuarial projections will need to be collected for 
each year of study, rather than making generalized assumptions about these projections.  Finally, the “perfect 
forecast perception” uses the historical data available at the present day and assumes that agents were able to 
accurately forecast the historical trends.  Of course relying on this formulation would not make much sense.  
Nonetheless, since we do not have a clear picture of how SSW expectations are formed, the best economists can do 
is to try a number of different specifications for Social Security Wealth and hope that the resulting regression 
estimates for its effect are comparable, weighing the results of a study with the appropriateness of the assumptions 
used. 
Leimer and Lesnoy do show, however, that the impact of Social Security Wealth depends a great deal on 
the assumptions used to calculate it, and also on the time span under study.  They created new assumptions to apply 
to the data, which updated some of Feldstein‟s old assumptions, and they used each of these two sets of assumptions 
(Feldstein‟s and their own) to calculate SSW for each of the algorithms.  They find that for the years 1930 to 1974, 
neither the Feldstein assumptions nor their own assumptions produce a coefficient with statistical significance for 
the SSW variable under any algorithm.  While not significant, all algorithms produce positive coefficients (decrease 
savings) with Feldstein‟s data assumptions, and all algorithms produce negative coefficients (increase savings) for 
Leimer and Lesnoy‟s assumptions.  However, removing just the year 1930 leads all methods to have negative but 
insignificant effects for the Feldstein assumptions.   Changing the estimation period to 1947-1974, they obtain 
statistical significance for SSW using the “constant ratio” and “perfect foresight” algorithms for both sets of 
assumptions, and in these cases the coefficient imply that SSW increases private savings.  What is concluded from 
these divergent results is that one cannot place much faith in using the time series results to show that SSW 
decreases private savings.  An insignificant relationship between SSW and savings could imply the applicability of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2
It is worth noting that Feldstein (1996) updated his methods and results to account for data up to 1992.  His 
conclusion is that personal savings is decreased by 66% and, overall, private savings is decreased by nearly 60%. 
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the life-cycle model with the asset-substitution and retirement effects balance out.  But it is also consistent with the 
notion that the life-cycle model is not suitable for understanding peoples‟ retirement savings patterns. 
II. Formulating the Social Security Wealth Variable 
Social Security Wealth is an estimate of the population‟s expected future Social Security benefits for any 
given year.  Clearly, such projections of SSW depend on many diverse factors.  These include the age, gender, and 
marriage composition of the labor force population participating in the Social Security program, the level of 
expected future benefits, and the level of workers‟ earnings.  As outlined in the Social Security Trustees‟ Report, 
these factors in turn depend on future marriage and divorce rates, birth rates, death rates, migration rates, labor force 
participation and unemployment rates, disability incidence and termination rates, retirement age patterns, 
productivity gains, wage increases, inflation, as well as other economic and demographic factors.  Three different 
methodologies are used here to construct the SSW variable.  These include replicating the  “constant ratio” and 
“current ratio” approaches, as well as using a more rigorous procedure to calculate the “best information 
perception.”  The study will cover the years 1975 to 1998.  This reflects a period in which Social Security benefits 
were automatically adjusted annually by the growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI-W).  Prior to 1975, benefit 
increases were made in an ad hoc fashion at the whims of Congress, which would complicate people‟s expectations 
about their future benefits.     
Social Security Wealth Using the “Constant Ratio” and “Current Ratio” Algorithms 
For each year under study (1975-1998), the following formula can be used to calculate the expected gross 
Social Security Wealth for that year: 
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 Moving from left to right, we see that the formula is used for men and women separately, which is 
important because each has different life expectancies.  Next, the formula provides a sum over all ages in the 
working age population, from 20 to 64.  For each age group, we next see that their expected benefits in constant 
dollars of year “t” are a discounted form of a ratio (B/YD) multiplied by the per capital disposable income.  Under 
the “constant ratio” method, this value is set to 0.44, which is the average ratio of benefits for retired workers to 
disposable income in the years under study.  For the “current ratio,” the actual ratio for each year is used, and this 
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ratio varies between 0.40 and 0.49.  Next, Na,t is the number of fully insured people of age “a” of the appropriate 
gender in year “t.”  Fully insured individuals are defined as those who will be eligible for Social Security as a result 
of their own labor, but not those who will be eligible only through their spouse‟s labor.  Sa,65 and S65,i represent the 
probability that an “a” year old man (or woman) will live to 65 (the normal retirement age under the Feldstein 
framework), and that a 65 year old man (or woman) will live to age “i,” where “i” is larger than 65.  These 
calculations stop at age 100, because the probabilities of living beyond that age become sufficiently small.  
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represent the discounting to be done to the expected benefit for each year it is received.  
“g” is the assumed growth rate of real per capita disposable income in constant dollars of year “t.”  For this study, a 
value of 2% is used, despite the actual average being 1.57% during the years of study, because this value must be 
projected far into the future and 2% is the value proposed by Feldstein.  Finally, “d” is the discount factor assumed 
for people, how much less they value benefits in the future over just having the benefits today.  In accordance with 
Feldstein, a discount factor of 3% per year is used.  If the procedure was left as it is above, we would have our 
estimates for the SSW of retired workers.  A correction is made to account for the retirement benefits of dependent 
spouses and widows.  Such people received 22% of benefits in 1975 and 25.7% of benefits in 1998.   
 The calculation of the present value of Social Security taxes follows a procedure similar to above: 
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 This formula accounts for males and females separately, adding their expected taxes to be paid throughout 
the remaining working years for each age “a” for each year “t.”  The proportion 0.0877 of disposable income 
represents the average ratio of Social Security taxes to disposable income throughout the years of study.  Again, N 
represents the number of fully insured men (or women) of age “a” in year “t,” S represents the probability of 
surviving from age “a” to age “m” bigger than “a,” and separate rates were used for men and women.  “g” is still 
2%, and “d” is 3%.  The tax series values are consistently less than the expected benefits, showing that the system is 
still not actuarially fair in that people can expect to receive more in benefits than they pay into the system at a 3% 
discount rate.     
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Social Security Wealth Using the “Best Information Perception” Algorithm 
The “best information perception” approach follows the previous approaches in spirit, but adds additional 
rigor in two specific areas.  First, in 1983, changes were made to the normal retirement age.  This age had always 
been 65, but in 2003 it began adjusting upward such that in 2009 in becomes 66 and in 2027 it becomes 67.  These 
changes start affecting people born in 1938, and 67 is the retirement age for anyone born after 1960.  The “best 
information” approach uses 65 as the retirement age for years between 1975 and 1983, but for years 1984 and after, 
the new retirement ages are incorporated into the calculations.  The second area of increasing rigor is that rather than 
using the growth rates of real per capita disposable income, this approach uses the projections for the real wage 
differentials provided by the Annual Trustees Reports of the Social Security Administration for each year since 1975 
under the intermediate assumptions.  The real wage differential is a measure of the difference between the annual 
growth in average wage levels and the annual growth in the Consumer Price Index.  This differential is what is 
actually used by the Social Security Administration to calculate future starting benefits.  For all years between 1975 
and 1998, these projects are used to calculate the expected annual starting benefit for forty-seven years into the 
future.  The annual starting benefit is based on the value of Social Security benefits to the retired worker of average 
earnings for the year “t.”  Once a person receives their expected starting benefit, it remains unchanged when 
measured in constant dollars of the year “t,” because, since 1975, Social Security benefits have undergone an annual 
Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) to keep up with the Consumer Price Index.  Figure I shows the time series 
trends for these estimates. 
FIGURE I:  SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH, 1975-1998 
(all series discounted at 3% level) 
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The “constant ratio” and “current ratio” series both trend upward over time.  This is primarily the result of the steady 
growth in real wages that allows for benefits to grow faster than inflation over time.  Also important is the increasing 
labor force participation of women, which allows more women to become eligible for benefits under their own 
earnings record rather than that of their spouse‟s.  The importance of this is that working women will receive larger 
benefits than dependent women, and so as female labor force participation increases, the per capita benefit level 
increases.  Between 1975 and 1998, the percent of women who were fully insured grew from under 80 percent to 
over 90 percent for those aged 25 to 44, and grew from about 66 percent to over 80 percent from those aged 45 to 64.  
For the “best information” series, these upward general movements are less apparent, because the variation in real 
per capita income growth also plays a role, as well as the change in retirement age passed into law in 1983.  The dip 
occurring in 1979 and 1980 can be explained by the very high future rates of inflation forecasted for those years, 
which led to negative real wage differentials in the immediate future and a general decrease in future starting benefit 
levels.  In 1984, the dip occurs because of the legislated increases in retirement ages previously discussed.  Neither 
of these impacts are reflected in the simplied assumptions of the “constant ratio” and “current ratio” series.  Another 
drop occurs in 1991, as the projections for real wage differentials undertook a fundamental drop.  For 1990 and 
before, the smallest value for the long term real wage differential was 1.7, but for 1991 and after its largest value 
was 1.1.  This fact serves to decrease future starting benefit levels.  As such, the “best information” perception is a 
much better reflection of reality than the other approaches.   
III. Regression Specification and Data Used 
In accordance with the literature on the subject, we use a modification of the traditional aggregate 
consumption function created by Ando and Modigliani (1963), which sets consumption as a function of permanent 
income and the stock of household wealth.  The first regression specification is that used by Martin Feldstein (1974).  
He estimated the effects of Social Security Wealth by adding it to the Ando and Modigliani model and by defining 
permanent income as disposable income and disposable income lagged: 
Ct =  + 1YDt + 2YDt-13 Wt  SSWt + t, 
where C is consumer expenditure, YD is disposable income, W is the stock of household wealth at the end of the 
year (excluding SSW), SSW is the measure of Social Security Wealth, and  represents the stochastic error term for 
missing factors.   Feldstein also used a specification including retained earnings, which he thought of as a part of 
wealth owned by the households representing current and future capital gains:  
(1) 
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Ct =  + 1YDt + 2YDt-13 Wt 4 REt  SSWt + t  
The third specification is motivated by Barro (1978).  It adds the government sector surplus, the stock of consumer 
durables, and the product of unemployment and disposable income to the equation: 
Ct =  + 1YDt + 2YDt-13Wt 4REt 5SURt 6DURt 7 (Ut*YDt SSWt  + t 
Personal consumption expenditure, disposable income, and government sector surplus are available from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis‟ National Income and Product Accounts; Household net worth and the stock of 
consumer durables are available from the Federal Reserve Boards‟ Balance Sheets for the United States Economy; 
Retained earnings is from the Internal Revenue Service‟s Statistics of Income,Corporation Income Tax Returns; and 
the unemployment rate for the total labor force is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  For these regressions, the 
aggregate data was deflated by total population and by the CPI-W to create a series of data in per capita 1982-1984 
real dollars.    
IV. Empirical Estimations of the Social Security Wealth Effects 
Results of the regressions for equations (1) to (3) are presented in Table I for the three different measures of 
Social Security Wealth.  Using Equation (1), statistical significance is obtained for all SSW coefficients. 
Interestingly, the equation using the “constant ratio” produced a large negative coefficient, with an impossibly large 
coefficient of 1.73 for disposable income.  Meanwhile, the coefficient for the “best information” algorithm is 0.034 
and the “current ratio” algorithm 0.125.  Relevant to the empirical results is the effect that Social Security Wealth is 
estimated to have on personal savings.  These percentages are provided for each regression in the far right column of 
Table I.  The method used to calculate them is similar to that used in Feldstein (1974).  For example consider the 
first equation in Table I for the “best information” algorithm.  Using 1995 as a base year for calculations, the 
estimate of Social Security Wealth in aggregate nominal terms is $7,523.8 billion.  Multiplied by the SSW 
coefficient of 0.034, the implied linear projection is that SSW increased personal consumption expenditure by 
$241.61 billion, and thus decreased personal saving by an equal amount.  Next, we look to the Old Age and 
Survivors Insurance net contributions (payroll tax) for 1995 to see it is $304.62 billion.  The next step, ignored by 
Feldstein in his 1996 update paper, is that we should subtract from the payroll tax the Trust Fund surplus generated 
in 1995, which is $45.04 billion, since this surplus will be added to the Trust Fund that is invested into government 
bonds and spent on special projects and programs.  This leaves the net payroll tax that is being paid to 1995 
beneficiaries, rather than being invested, of $259.58 billion.  Multiplying this by the long run propensity to consume 
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of 0.817 (the coefficient of disposable income in this specification), we see that $212.08 billion of this would have 
been consumed, and the other $47.5 billion would have been saved.  Combining these SSW and payroll tax effects 
provides us with an estimate of $289.11 billion of lost savings.  However, total personal savings was $302.4 billion 
for 1995.  This implies that the combined effect of Social Security was to decrease private savings by almost 50% in 
1995.  In other words, a one dollar increase in SSW is projected to cause a 3.4 cent decrease in personal savings, 
implying an overall 50% decrease in personal savings.  Feldstein then generalizes this number for all years, and he 
would say that Social Security decreases private savings by 50%.   
Using Equation (2), which adds retained earning, the results are all quite similar as with (1).  In this case, 
the coefficient of 0.033 for the “best information” algorithm implies a 48% decrease in savings.  As for the other 
methods for defining SSW, the “constant ratio” method still produces an impossible coefficient for disposable 
income (1.59), and it provides another negative coeffient for SSW, which implies a positive relationship between 
Social Security and private savings, though in this case it is not significant.  Meanswhile, the SSW coefficient for 
the “current ratio” is quite large, implying a decrease in personal savings of 84%. 
Equation (3) presents the same type of results as Barro found with his regressions over 20 years ago, at 
least for the “best information” SSW variable.  Essentially, the coefficient in the “best information” is now smaller 
than in the previous counterparts, and it has also lost its statistical significance at the 5% level.  As with Barro‟s 
regressions, these results remove some of the impact of SSW in determining savings, though Feldstein would 
ascribe this result to having too many covariates with too few years of data.  As for the other three SSW variables, 
the coefficient for the “constant ratio” is now larger than zero, but can hardly be distinguished from zero.  The 
coefficient for the “current ratio” approach is significant and positive, and it implies an 87% decrease in personal 
savings.   
Examining these three specifications, the SSW variable based on the “best information” algorithm have 
produced coefficients of magnitude and significance as Feldstein had found in his work.  Additionally, as Barro 
expected, the significance of these coefficients diminished when his additional variables were added to the 
regression.  However, the two SSW variables based on the simpler Feldstein estimation methods (the “constant 
ratio” and “current ratio”) produced results that were generally economically implausible, either from the standpoint 
of disposable income or from the coefficient for SSW.  Perhaps because these variables resulted in a general upward 
trend in SSW similar to the trend in disposable income, the problems of multicollinearity and of having too few 
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years of data were too severe to obtain adequate results.  The approaches also seem inferior to the “best information” 
approach as, for example, the legislated increases in retirement ages were widely reported and would have 
undoubtedly affect peoples‟ expectations about the future Social Security benefits. 
V. Conclusions  
 Using time series evidence to compute the effects of Social Security on private savings is an idea 
popularized in the 1970s.  This paper has updated the SSW variables and the regression analysis to include the years 
up to 1998.  There is value in doing this, because the data available about fully insured people is much better today 
than in the 1970s when all work had to be done using estimates from labor force participation rates.  Under the “best 
information” algorithm, the conclusion of Martin Feldstein still holds true in that SSW appears to be negatively 
related to private savings.  Little confidence can seemingly be placed in the other results because of their erratic 
SSW or disposable income coefficients, and of course this leaves open the possibility that the results from the “best 
information” algorithm appear “reasonable” only by chance.  The results provided here should provide mild support 
to the notion that SSW decreases personal savings, even if the findings are not all that robust.  But even if this 
negative relationship held, it is not meant to imply that Social Security should be ended.  The costs of the program 
must be weighed against its benefits, and the role that Social Security plays in providing economic security to 
millions of elderly people is a very strong positive needing to be fully appreciated in any type of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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TABLE I 
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH ON CONSUMER SPENDING, 1975-1998 
 
EQN. YD YD -1 W RE  SUR DUR U*YD SSW DWS 
SSW 
Effect 
(1) 
.817 
(8.16) 
.183 
(1.76) 
.014 
(1.33) 
    best 
.034 
(2.51) 
1.60 50% 
(1) 
1.73 
(4.50) 
.071 
(.70) 
.034 
(3.75) 
    constant 
-.386  
(-2.52) 
1.86 -- 
(1) 
.663 
(5.26) 
.125 
(1.22) 
.015 
(1.34) 
        current 
.125 
(2.18) 
1.81 82% 
(2) 
.864 
(7.95) 
.232 
(2.02) 
0 
(0) 
.089 
(1.23) 
   best 
.033 
(2.37) 
1.85 48% 
(2) 
1.59 
(3.54) 
.106 
(.86) 
.024 
(1.06) 
.038 
(.42) 
   constant 
-.319  
(-1.63) 
1.87 -- 
(2) 
.701 
(5.47) 
.187 
(1.71) 
-.007 
(-.40) 
.142 
(1.87) 
      current 
.137 
(2.38) 
2.17 84% 
(3) 
.788 
(5.18) 
.161 
(1.20) 
-.005 
(-.21) 
.157 
(1.35) 
-.099 
(-.29) 
.479 
(1.43) 
.206 
(.28) 
best 
.024 
(1.43) 
1.98 44% 
(3) 
.565 
(.86) 
.079 
(.59) 
-.023 
(-.72) 
.238 
(1.72) 
.031 
(.09) 
.789 
(2.11) 
.689 
(.98) 
constant 
.108 
(.40) 
2.10 82% 
(3) 
.489 
(2.91) 
.074 
(.71) 
-.010 
(-.49) 
.211 
(2.28) 
-.122 
(-.45) 
.740 
(2.95) 
.049 
(.08) 
current 
.171 
(2.98) 
2.27 87% 
 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Coefficients in boldface are statistically significant at the 5% level.  All 
equations include a constant term and are estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for autocorrelated 
disturbances.  The Durbin-Watson statistics presented are the transformed Cochrane-Orcutt values.  “SSW Effect” 
presents the estimated decrease to personal savings caused by Social Security, calculated under the framework 
outlined in Section IV.  The SSW variables “best,” “constant,” and “current” refer to the “best information 
perception,” “constant ratio,” and “current ratio” algorithms, all discounted at the 3 percent level.  
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TABLE II 
VALUES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH VARIABLES 
( per capita dollars, deflated by 1982-1984 CPI-W index ) 
 
YEAR “best” “constant” “current” “taxes” 
1975 23227.11 19634.75 19644.48 8734.20 
1976 25594.41 20350.49 21462.94 9194.05 
1977 26163.14 20998.80 22478.22 9633.55 
1978 25708.57 21769.68 22707.35 10140.06 
1979 23613.85 21675.32 22153.26 10249.36 
1980 21039.39 21126.36 21760.62 10140.36 
1981 24933.82 21283.96 22523.14 10204.62 
1982 26237.97 21468.88 23373.62 10282.19 
1983 26346.22 22385.95 24178.71 10710.25 
1984 21249.68 24134.46 24710.10 11535.19 
1985 21020.21 24908.92 25090.03 11893.76 
1986 21911.17 25830.14 25404.33 12299.25 
1987 22130.85 26422.28 25998.12 12505.48 
1988 22036.13 27470.34 26382.48 12932.11 
1989 21721.38 28077.54 26891.80 13171.42 
1990 21928.31 28318.10 27264.45 13305.47 
1991 19059.63 28046.97 27354.30 13167.39 
1992 19564.84 28571.70 27487.18 13361.78 
1993 19442.52 28480.77 27552.69 13238.17 
1994 18997.46 28735.87 27733.39 13294.73 
1995 19082.69 29073.90 27846.01 13374.57 
1996 19386.00 29533.35 28226.62 13415.74 
1997 19281.40 30431.43 28650.58 13616.60 
1998 20050.91 31802.08 29071.54 14055.90 
Note: The SSW variables “best,” “constant,” and “current” refer to the “best information perception,” “constant 
ratio,” and “current ratio” algorithms, all discounted at the 3 percent level.  The variable “taxes” is the expected 
present value of tax collections for Social Security, assuming a 3% discount rate.   
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TABLE III 
VALUES OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION VARIABLES 
( per capita dollars, deflated by 1982-1984 CPI-W index ) 
 
DATE C YD W RE  DUR SUR U 
1975 8816.83 10109.88 41931.95 4860.68 4595.40 -593.04 8.5 
1976 9216.60 10419.77 44343.55 5230.33 4729.34 -424.84 7.7 
1977 9528.73 10703.42 44848.53 5493.33 4874.68 -336.90 7 
1978 9795.54 11058.33 46539.78 5718.18 5067.60 -184.21 6.1 
1979 9701.11 10988.88 47676.03 5828.08 5050.20 -69.28 5.8 
1980 9339.21 10700.17 47784.71 5668.47 4863.23 -285.01 7.2 
1981 9248.41 10693.08 46365.71 5565.60 4699.84 -255.45 7.6 
1982 9241.26 10696.80 46604.07 5457.73 4564.41 -589.33 9.7 
1983 9777.99 11059.25 48428.06 5448.37 4652.93 -743.70 9.6 
1984 10230.91 11824.68 49827.76 5356.24 4791.13 -688.37 7.5 
1985 10639.46 12105.99 53640.52 5357.78 4961.63 -694.63 7.2 
1986 11075.74 12480.86 57708.45 5332.82 5317.52 -734.89 7 
1987 11368.48 12665.20 58824.82 5187.63 5517.12 -541.46 6.2 
1988 11704.97 13085.19 61304.12 5206.32 5722.42 -479.13 5.5 
1989 11858.07 13241.46 63696.70 5017.93 5812.49 -428.60 5.3 
1990 11880.62 13313.49 61249.61 4372.09 5786.05 -536.43 5.6 
1991 11701.47 13185.37 62853.57 4246.03 5701.64 -634.40 6.8 
1992 11926.75 13470.54 63349.45 4054.25 5680.49 -842.87 7.5 
1993 12141.38 13451.27 64011.61 4529.82 5745.40 -747.07 6.9 
1994 12425.34 13608.23 63441.31 4473.37 5864.39 -559.30 6.1 
1995 12602.92 13753.39 67706.79 5557.05 5876.63 -486.97 5.6 
1996 12796.56 13872.08 70822.71 6154.57 5878.48 -334.24 5.4 
1997 13096.08 14135.61 76724.78 6743.08 5902.27 -115.58 4.9 
1998 13559.15 14646.26 82769.92 7357.89 6094.88 108.69 4.5 
 
Note: 
C: Personal Consumption Expenditure.  Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis  
YD: Disposable Income.  Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
W: Household Net Worth at end of year.  These numbers have removed the nonprofit organizations 
component.  Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Balance Sheets for the U.S. 
Economy  
RE: Gross Retained Earnings.  Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Corporation Income 
Tax Returns, annual. 
DUR: Stock of Consumer Durables.  Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Balance 
Sheets for the U.S. Economy  
SUR: Government Sector Surplus.  Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
U: Unemployment Rate.  Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics  
 
